The Moorish Wanderer

Wandering Thoughts Vol. 5

Posted in Flash News, Morocco, Read & Heard, Tiny bit of Politics by Zouhair ABH on January 13, 2011

Do allow me to try something different here. Less tiresome, and a bit more entertaining. On second thoughts, let’s make entirely irrelevant.

Boredom. Humanity's worst enemy

I would like to talk about Tunisia and Algeria, but then I refrained from it. I mean, they deserve every bit of my sympathy, and I feel I should be showing more solidarity, which would not exceed re-tweeting videos, articles and comments followed by the hashtag #sidibouzid. I feel contrite because deep down, I grew insensitive of sufferings our neighbours are going through, and even to the effects of creeping authoritarianism in Morocco. When events over take the cloistered intellectual, the ivory tower, as it were, looks cosier than ever. I’m elaborating on that later on.

I don’t know if it’s the weather, or my latest readings that got me in such mood. Or both. In any case, I have little to write about (not really, I am taking my time in posting), so it’s going to be the regular “Review for 2010”. I mean, we’re still in the first quarter of January, so there’s no harm in keeping up with the new year’s eve spirit. A couple of events I found interesting:

Early January, I remember I did something rather unusual, namely trying to hear the King’s speech on the radio. I usually watch it on the telly (when I am in the presence of one, that is) or I would just wait for the next day, and I can get the transcript and exhaustive, lauding comments. But January, 3rd was special. As it turned out, it wasn’t quite so. But the veneer of ‘mystery communication’ around it (His Majesty usually delivers speeches on National holidays) managed to capture an additional auditorium. January 2010 was therefore the kicking start of a nation-wide discussion about local government in Morocco. It seems the official in charge of the commission is about to publish his findings (and sum up what political parties and the civil societies have communicated themselves) What kind of  de-centralization are we up to? Sure, there was the Local Government bill in 1997, but it had the adverse effect of strengthening the Interior department’s grip. And it is virtually impossible to forecast anything beyond a redrawing of administrative borders. To be followed (and announced)

March was a bit of a surprise to me: as it happened, I was working on the Bloomberg screen, and for those who hadn’t the opportunity to use it, there’s a kind of a telex with flash info, among which Standard & Poor’s was upgrading Morocco’s sovereign debt to Investment Grade. It was good news, in the sense that our country risk profile was improving, and at a time when money is short. Later on, it turned out the upgrade had a positive effect on the bond issue on June. In financial terms, the upgrade was good news. But like all news, there’s a blessing but also a curse looming by. In terms of macroeconomic variables, Morocco got through painful adjustment policies. The macro-economic variables that are referred to here are mainly of public policy: the sustained trend in reducing public debt and the efforts in keeping under control, as well as the low levels of inflation achieved (among others, by freezing wages). These policies were carried out over two decades (adjustment program plus the alternance government since 1997)

Late May, our Communications Minister had to bear the shameful behaviour of his son in public space, at a time our Radoteur en Chef was busy leading the charge against the independent press, or indeed doggedly promoting the official line of ‘Morocco: an isle of stability and democracy’. Now, the child’s misbehaviour should not reflect on his capacity as a father. Politics is about higher matters. The trouble with Prof. Naciri is his dirty mouth: he  is only too willing to do the regime’s bidding in disparaging the press. When newspapers like Al Massae got hold of the story, that was tit for tat, web-citizens were very resentful as well and when the story broke out, there were some pretty acrimonious comments about our valiant minister.In a nutshell, Naciri Junior had a driving dispute with a regular citizen, and assaulted him with a baseball bat near Parliament Avenue. The trouble is, a video was snatched. I assume that was him carrying back his son who was handcuffed to the Parliament fence. Regular citizens obligingly walked them back to the car…


June, the effect of S&P upgrade got us money. Big money at good terms, considering how volatile the capital markets were at the time. € 1.bn at 4.5% is a good deal – even Greece or Portugal couldn’t levy such amount at such interest rate. Now, it appears the government has not started preparing schemes for spending the money, and instead, the Office des Changes is passing liberal legislation that would just allow for more hard currency to get out of the country. As if Bank Al Maghrib had unlimited foreign reserves, or did not have to sustain pegs against Euro. Ultimately, there’s a chance this money would be squandered into non-productive spendings (I had information the government is experiencing cash difficulties at the time)

November was hot in the Sahara. It started as a peaceful, apolitical protest against abysmal economic conditions, endemic corruption and the like -just like elsewhere in Morocco- but amateurism on behalf of the officials ensured the protest to turn political and provide ammunition for the Polisario. If I may, security officials are as guilty as those who killed -quite gruesomely- elements of the security forces. On the communications front, once more media coverage proved that it’s high time some high-minded PR professionals are needed to advance Morocco’s claim. On my book, things look like a game of chassé-croisé: every year, one of the two sides pulls a trick, scores some points, but ultimately no one further their claim, and a durable peace settlement seem more than ever, unlikely.

So, let’s get back to the Tunisian case. If there was a country in the MENA region that was unlikely to host a popular uprising, it was Tunisia. a Police state that made extensive use of the small area and denizens. A totalitarian state, in the sense that repression was micro-managed, where spaces of free expression are so tightly squared, and occasionally squashed when they dare expand. And a month ago, the myth of the ‘Tunisian model’ as it were, came tumbling down. That’s good news, because it might prompt other neighbouring people to chance a revolt. Not that it does not entail costs (among other, 20 to 50 dead following sources) and risks of reprisals. But then again, Tunisians reached that tipping point, beyond which it matters little if the truncheon blow was painful or not. In many ways, the uprising just shows people are not entirely submissive in the MENA region.

Tunisian Army APC in Gafsa. (Picture: nawaat.org)

That said, I still have doubts about the outcome. There are reports the army is moving in, and even rumours of the Ben Ali household preparing exit strategy. Until there are occurrences of Army and Police mutiny and fraternisation with demonstrators, the whole thing would be at best a change in leadership but not in the regime, at worse, God forbids, a bloodbath.

While they deserve every bit of sympathy, I don’t necessarily relate to them. Partly because I am far away in a cosy place, but also because one cannot help but try analogies about Morocco, the great: “what if ?” as it were. And that’s the trouble: there’s considerable resentment among the Moroccan people; no need for forensic analysis there, one just need to enumerate the number of protests, sit-ins, demonstrations and so on. What happened in Tunisia could also happen in Morocco. The trouble is, our country is larger, and from past history, large-scale riots always end up with the army cleaning up the lot. Perhaps soldiers would be less willing to shoot fellow Moroccans, but still. The prospect of a revolt in Morocco  is not at all engaging.

On the other hand, we cannot go on like this. Someone, or something has to lance the boil: Morocco is growing richer, but there’s a widening gap in income distribution, growing resentment against social injustice, institutionalized corruption, endemic cronyism and so on. Because the outcome is too violent to bear, I get to the craven decision to retire back to my ivory tower (talking about the West Wing or Georges Smiley for instance) because the world does not make sense, or if I try to figure it out, at the end of the line, the unknown is mixed with chaos. I am defaulting on my role as a would-be organic intellectual, but sorry, I’ve got better things to get to.  Proving that there’s a subgame perfect equilibrium in determining monetary policy, for instance.

Oh, I’ve just received ‘Zombie Economics‘ by J.  Quiggin, PhD. My tutor recommended it as a good reading. I should post something about it once I’ve finished it.

Wandering Thoughts, Vol.4

Posted in Flash News, Read & Heard, The Wanderer, Tiny bit of Politics by Zouhair ABH on January 8, 2011

I got nominated as finalist for the MBA, which means potentially I might be the best Moroccan blogger for 2011. I cannot emphasise how unimportant this is to me, but there’s always the ego, lurking in the shadow, and hoping for some peer recognition, which I must confess. You do understand that I would be counting on your vote to boost that ego a bit.Now, if you like reading an intellectual, well-written (the commentators say so, to my delight, I must say) and well documented blog, I suppose you would like to vote for me. If not, there’s plenty of choice out there to nominate for best Moroccan male blogger. My gratitude for the regular readers. Vote for Me.

On the other hand, you can also vote for me as a nominee for another blog award, the Morocco Blogs.

Tucker's comment: "Wake up and smell the cock. Na, scratch that. It's not like he was the ideal candidate. If anything, he had to dress like one of Lord Sutche fucking Raving Monster party loonies. And, come to think of it, if he really wins, we are going to have a wee bit of an ego problem. I'm just saying".

Three topics on the menu: the West Wing (the TV show, not the actual one), John Le Carré, and finally, the rising tide in neighbouring countries, Algeria, but more specifically Tunisia.

I am now at the third season of the West Wing, and still 4 to go (to which I am looking forward). I can’t get enough of the Opening Theme (It reminds me of some other US  TV show, I cannot recall which, but the theme is rousing indeed). For those who did not know about the show, the West Wing depicts everyday politics in the White House, in the West Wing to be precise, where the Oval Office, and the working headquarters of senior staff to the President of the USA, are located. The show focuses on the Communications team, besides the Chief of Staff. Politics worked sometimes as a background for individual stories, as the storyline goes on, the viewer learns about the characters, which gives a human touch to the whole thing. The West Wing is perhaps -to my knowledge- one of the very few TV shows actually pushing for a more positive view on politics.

From left to right: Charlie Young (Dullé Hill), Sam Seaborn (Rob Lowe), C.J. Craig (Allison Janney), Jed Bartlet (Martin Sheen), Toby Ziegler (Richard Schiff), Abigail Bartlet (Stockard Channard), Leo McGarry (John Spencer), Donna Moss (Janel Moloney), Josh Lyman (Bradley Whitford)

The show has a prestigious cast: the President Josiah ‘Jed’ Bartlet PhD. (D) is portrayed by the memorable Martin Sheen (among others, Apocalypse Now). My impression is, this president is a synthesis of previous ones: Bartlet is Catholic (and most probably Irish, not because he attended Notre Dame University) like  John F. Kennedy, he is a scholar (economics, my favourite !), like Bill Clinton (who is a Doctor of Law) and he has a je-ne-sais-quoi aura of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In any case, he looks and sounds like the best US President the country never had: intellectual, witty, cosmopolitan, a father figure… That’s the difference between real life and show business. In any case, Martin Sheen renders a very decent play of a Liberal president, summing up the best of every Democratic president the USA had for the last century. The other members of the cast played their part wonderfully well too: his Chief Of Staff, veteran Leo McGarry, a mixture of friend and counsellor, the gloomy Director of Communications and Domestic Policy adviser, Tobias Ziegler (his caustic sense of humour is winner), deputy Chief of Staff (and ) Josh Lyman the President’s speechwriter Sam Seaborn (Rob Lowe’s portrayal is quite impressive) and many others.

Now, the show is brilliant. No doubt about that. There are however -as it is the case with any politics show- some hidden messages, hints I should say, that inevitably slip by: I am not an expert, nor even a documented follower of US domestic politics, but it looks as though institutions are bogged down in partisan struggle, while desperately trying to look ‘bipartisan’; the curse of trying to look centrist, I suppose. This holds for both sides: it appears that a President with a minority House of Representative (or indeed Congress as a whole) cannot carry out their policy, unless they get into some back-room deals (senior staff usually do the President’s bidding) that result in angering the party base, or force the administration to move to the middle ground, which is not always good, even in media terms.

Martin Sheen's rendition of Barlet is stunning. The character is a fantasy of the ideal President (for Liberals, that is).

The show also portrays the heavy reliance -and in real life, that’s also the case- on pollsters, advertising, consumer psychology, and all sorts of marketing concepts that were imported from Corporate world. Rationalizing government and communication is a good thing, but the impression I got, right from the 3rd season, was that the show was more focused on the senior staff trying to get hold of the news cycle, to manage it, rather than get the policy going: when it is not mid-term election, it’s an important piece of legislation that needs to be forced through by staging media strategy, and before you know it, there’s presidential nomination, and then re-election campaigning. I am caricaturing a bit, though comparatively little attention is given to economics (that might be tempered, as the Bartlet administration often congratulated itself for the good economic performance the US was enjoying), much more to collective bargaining (Unions and employers would from time to time lobby the West Wing one way or the other) or indeed social policy.

All in all, it’s a pleasant piece to watch. And accounts from real-life senior staffers at the White House confirm that a great deal of accuracy was put on the show to render a realistic view from within. I also like the struggle all characters had to live through, between remaining faithful to their principles, being idealistic as it were, and the need for compromise, or spinning it as such. As Lyman stated: ‘as an adult, I realize many would not share my view of the world‘. How true.

I just finished two of John Le Carré’s masterpieces: “Tinker, Taylor, Soldier, Spy” and “Smiley’s People”. I watched the TV adaptation of both of them with the exquisite Alec Guiness (in the 1970’s if I am not mistaken). I know, spy novels are a bit old-fashion, but George Smiley is no James Bond: he is not athletic, but rather an old man, retired from the service. The first book, “Tinker, Taylor, Soldier, Spy”, is a classic story of mole-hunting. Before I start elaborating on the story itself, There’s something very ‘old-school’ in the codes John Le Carré gives to certain organizations: the Intelligence service is called ‘The Circus’, its head is simply referred to as ‘Control’ and the respective heads of units in the Circus are all chaps from Oxford or Cambridge, the flower of British intellect; Scalp-hunter is another of these code-names assigned for specific jobs or positions -in this case, an agent in charge of recruiting potential correspondents. Among them, a traitor. Smiley, an exhausted and retired member of the Circus is drafted again into service. It is worth mentioning that John Le Carré was himself a member of the British intelligence service MI-6 (and was stationed in Germany for a couple of years) and he drew considerable inspiration from his work to write his most excellent spy novels. There’s a difference with Ian Fleming’s James Bonds, in the sense that the tone is darker, the characters, more ambiguous and less inclined to think of themselves as marshalled into the great struggle against the evil axis. Smiley, Guilham or Esterhaze are of different stock: morality goes out of the window.

On the East/West German border, Karla (P. Stewart, left) surrenders to Smiley (A. Guiness, right)

Smiley had an enemy. Rather an opposite number, for when they met (in Smiley’s people, as part of Smiley’s final victory) he felt contrite for the kind of methods he resorted to. Simely’s opposite number, codename Karla, was a Soviet spymaster who was successful in plating a mole (in a very devious way indeed) into the SIS (Circus). The mole, codename ‘Gerald’, was Bill Haydon (Ian Richardson), Smiley’s colleague, friend, rival and occasional lover of Smiley’s wife, Ann. Incidentally, Karla was apparently sketched on Markus Wolf, the East German master spy.

I have a personal history with intelligence work; And when I was a little boy, full of dreams, I devoted myself to the career of spy. Well, my raw model was no James Bond, and what attracted me to the job was more its cosmopolitan side (the person in question used to travel a lot and under various qualities) and the ease with which they can put up a cover story was, for me, the quintessential application of good lying.

A bit grown-up now, and although the job entails some very questionable assignments, morally-wise, as well as the incommensurable dangers it involves, I still have some irrational reverence for the occupation of secret agent.

The last piece is more serious: my impression is that a dam is about to crack. Will it burst open? I’m in two minds. In Tunisia, the ongoing  demonstrations might remind the sociologist of those in the 1980’s; The Sidi Bouzid events prompt me into re-reading a book (courtesy to the Sociology years) directed by D. Le Saout & M. Rollinde: “Emeutes et mouvements sociaux au Maghreb: Perspective Comparée“. Accounts of these riots are strikingly similar to those of today: “Le récit de ce qui s’est passé en ces jours [January 1984 riots] d’émeutes montre que les acteurs qui occupent la rue n’appartiennent pas, pour la plupart, aux mouvements sociaux structurés qui occupent la scène politique, sociale et culturelle de la Tunisie. Ils vont même à l’encontre des mots d’ordre lancés par la direction de ces mouvements. […]“.

What is surprising about Tunisia, it’s how few popular uprising occurred over the last half a century: under President Habib Bourguiba, riots of January 26, 1978 and January 1984 are the only recorded occurrences. Under Ben Ali, there was a tighter grip on security matters, not least because of the President’s background as, well, a Military officer (with a heavy emphasis on internal security and intelligence). For many years, Tunisia was the ‘model’ of allied ‘moderate regime’: here’s a country that has virtually suppressed any islamist threat, that keeps its population in line, and recurring use of torture is covered up by the seemingly sustained economic growth. Tunisia reminds me of these dictatorships in Latin America and South East Asia: economic miracle, successfully disposing of communist threat but at the price of human rights abuse, corruption and cronyism but faithful allies of the West.

Popular uprising are a bit like pressure-cook: when pressure is too high to bear, the top cover is blown; Even the air-valve might not be of use. That’s what looks like have happened in Sidi Bouzid: the self-immolation of that young fruit merchant ignited a ras-le-bol against injustice, inequality and ambient corruption; It is worthy to note that, for the time being, no political agenda is behind this, which can be seen as a strentgh and weakness. It’s strength because the regime cannot label it as a political plot (with Islamists in their sights) and thus being a genuine, nationwide protest is a plus. On the longer term, the revolt might end up as a short-lived,  feu-de-paille-like aggregate of riots. The danger to be so is due to the lack of a symbol, a leader that can provide credible alternative. The trouble with mass uprising is that it lacks a long-term view, there is a danger that this might at best, trigger insubstantial changes in the top offices at Tunis. At best, Ben Ali would be forced out of office, and another -very similar- President might be sworn-in: there is going to be a change of individuals, but the regime stays basically the same. The furore abates, but things do not fundamentally change. Furthermore, the regime has every incentive to play for time: they can count on Western neutrality (French media have been ludicrous in their belated reporting), they still have the support of Police, Army and Security troops. I wish all the best to Tunisian protesters in their venture, but time is not their ally. Very much like the Algerian people too. It is remarkable how similar their concerns are: both countries are enjoying good economic outlooks (Algeria, as an Oil-producing country, is richer than ever) but wealth redistribution is stingy at best, greedy in fact. Oligarchies are enjoying Western-like standards of life, while the common man struggles to meet ends. Nothing new, and nothing different from what’s happening in Morocco too.

I remain very pessimistic about the potential changes in these three countries: first because it looks to me as though it is another popular uprising with no political agenda. These things happened before, and in the past, they ended up with little changes, or worse, with reactionary outcomes (Algeria experienced regular Army interventions, and Moroccan troops slaughtered dozens, if not hundreds during the 1980’s). The new thing is that regular web-users around the world are better informed. There’s still some hope that now, with instant and widespread report of what might be happening in Sid Bouzid, or Tinghir or M’sila is almost instantly put on the internet. Would that help? Yes it would. Would it be a decisive factor? It does not look like it.

A Tunisian blogger has been arrest a few days ago. That’s the backlash of web-activism (which I always under-rated) in our countries. If you don’t care about these issues, at least do join the campaign Free Slim for humanitarian concerns. Thank you.

Media Strategy: We’ve Got It Wrong

Much as I would like to comment on the spiral of violence in the Sahara, I have to confess my equal distaste for siding either the Polisario or Makhzenian side. It would have felt like derogating to a credo I fancy: never mix history and media coverage.
Unless someone can claim to be an ubiquitous, omniscient, unbiased and flawless journalist roaming free and loose in the desert taking shots and recording interviews, no one can claim a fair report on the events of violence in Laayoune and other parts of the Sahara (not even the worldwide press agencies). At the present time, trying to make sense out of the Schmilblink is useless, if not the aim of deliberate propaganda, a typical “Them & Us” situation. Better wait and see. The bovine-minded would tease the doubtful for a perceived lack of patriotism, but the sensible way is to observe; the rest is idle chat.

Instead, I would reach upon a much reasonable subject: both sides fielded various sets of media and communication strategy, which would ultimately give the upper hand to either side prior to the expected negotiations on the Sahara issue. On the record, I assume Morocco has a strategy, because from where I see things, it looks bloody amateur to say the least. the Polisario, on the other hand, when they do not put their efficacious propaganda machine into action, benefit almost naturally from sympathetic reports from mainstream media. As far as I am concerned, in media terms, Morocco wiped out the sympathy it got from the Ould Salma case, and finds itself back in the script as the super-villain, close to the low ebb of November 2009, when Aminatou Haidar was expelled.

Clouds and Ashes over Laayoune (Demotix Picture)

Could it get any worse? Very easily so. Could things get better? Difficult, but feasible if our officials get their heads together and start changing their current strategy, or if they had no prior strategy, to come up with one that would rebuild Morocco’s damaged image. Otherwise, that’s incredible leverage to the Polisario in the upcoming UN-backed negotiation talks.

Media strategy in both sides differ wildly in style: in an age of instant information and shrinking margins for cover-ups, the Moroccan response communication strategy is, and one is economical with the terms, weak, and its efficiency highly questionable: deporting journalists and even members of  foreign parliaments does not help. Official web channels, the MAP for instance, have a very weird way in putting Morocco’s case. In facts it is targeting Moroccan audience. Never mind the foreigners, that’s the Moroccans we’ve got to focus on. On the foreign front, the communication strategy the Moroccan officials seem to follow can be reasonably summed up as follows: ideally, it would be enough to convince the 5 permanent members of the Security Council and around 10-11 non permanent members to back -or at least to abstain- a resolution recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty or its autonomy-based proposal, and as the old sayings goes: “جمع و طوي“. A state can claim sovereignty over a defined territory precisely because other sovereign states recognize the fact. Biafra did not make it because it lacked the proper support of sovereign powers, though it was never short of media and NGOs support. That’s the way our officials’ minds could be moving to.  Large sums of money are spent buying off friends in France, Spain, the US, etc… and paying off lobby agencies to market our side of the story to the high spheres of world leaders. Little is spent on media strategy. The idea seems to be that if the governments are ok with it, their mainstream media will follow suit. In short, there is only one media strategy, and that is to devote time and resources to stifle internal dissent. One tries very hard to notice differences in the way the 8 o’clock evening news briefings on the Saharan troubles of the past week differ from those of the early 1980’s. Save for stylistic differences, the message remains the same. For instance, there were casualties among the security forces; This is likely to trigger quite sympathetic comments from Moroccans readers, but to others, they are merely casualties like others. When a 14 years boy was shot around the protest camp, the same readers worldwide would almost instantly feel more upset about him then about the Moroccan policemen and paramilitary. That’s the way it goes down with the media. Experienced government with press officers and media PR professionals find it hard to deal with. Our authorities are definitely not up to scratch with that business.  Communications with the outside world are, at best, defensive and greet foreign observers with deliberate hostility.

On the other hand, the Polisario leads a guerilla-style propaganda. Their media strategy is definitely outward-looking. In short their Press agency does not differ much from ours. But they do not depend on it to rely their side of the story: much of the mainstream media reported their figures instead of the Morocco claims. The protesters at Agdayme Izik were protesting because of their economic difficulties (as the BBC noted) At the moment the media report the fact accurately, but it is at the same time, casting doubts on our officials’ tolerance for dissidence: “[…]But while the demands are social, the scale of the protest — the people in the tent camp represent a sizeable chunk of Western Sahara’s native population — is testing the Moroccan government’s tolerance for dissent, and its nerve.” In any case, the fact the common Moroccan citizen does not care whether the rest of the world believe Morocco is controlling by force a non-autonomous territory (a j’y suis j’y reste sort of state of mind is irrelevant. To readers  and viewers of well-known newspapers, media networks and TV channels, the Western Sahara will look like East Timor and Indonesia. Right now all the niceties about how complex the conflict is, as well as the criticism of the occult intertwined interest in this dispute dragging on for more than 50 years (trace it back to Mauritania’s independence, that is much more accurate) just flew out of the windows for the most vicious, partisan and nationalistic invectives from one side to the other. Algerian and Spanish media -in their majority- back the Polisario because they have special relationship with them. Morocco relies on friendly foreign countries to mop up the mess and stand by them. To the Polisario long-term media strategy of friendly media and reliable channels to echo their speech, our officials adopt short-sighted and short-term tactics that do worse than anything to our claim. Instead, they devote incredible resources to convince the Moroccan people -that are already obedient and compliant to the official line- that indeed, the acts of violence in Laayoune and elsewhere are a trifle. Some marginals and petty criminals that have gone rogue.

In media spin terms, Morocco fights the communications war just as badly as they did during the desert war of 1976-1991. Little training and absolutely no efficient contingent plan to parry enemy influence. On the media front, Morocco is as defensive as isolated as it has been during the 1980’s. And in facts, the way our communications are channelled did not change much before the cold war. These very strategies fail to capture the tremendous impact alternative media have on people’s mind. And whether we like it or not, the countries our officials are counting on to buttress our claim are democractic, and their elected leaders have to be accountable to their electorate. If these become convinced Morocco are the baddies, the friendship between our two countries won’t matter much…

So what? Do we have to stand idle and let them lead us to disaster? Can’t we devise some alternative diplomacy on the subject? Some did. or rather did try, and they were quite sloppy with it, leading to comparative results. The first thing to do, policy-wise, is to be open about it.The chaps at the interior ministry and the royal cabinet should overcome their fear and be open about things. Get an international panel of journalists from international newspapers, representative from foreign countries, NGO activists, UN representatives. Walk them through the scene of violence. At the age of instant information, damage control would be to accept international scrutiny. Second, be credible. It is obvious that standards of living and, to certain extent, civil liberties are better off from our side of the defensive wall. Be bold, media-savyy. It might be all spin, but in people’s mind -outside Morocco, it will look like an honest country trying to be democratic and open-minded, but that’s just the lousy separatists that want to to blow it off. It started to take off with Ould Salma, but now it is gone; I am getting all Malcom Tucker right now, but this spin stuff should not elude us from the core question: institutional reforms. response was weak and disorganised because of the cast-like bureaucratic hierarchy. What we call in Morocco: “التعليمات”. Instructions. The officials, especially at the interior ministry, cannot take a single decision without referring to their superiors. It goes very high all the way up, paralysing thus the local and central administration in case of emergency. And when initiatives are taken, they are sloppy too because no one will turn up and ask questions. For the Moroccan claim to be solid granite, basic democratic mechanisms have to be introduced in the actual spheres of power. If Morocco talks the talk of democracy and civil liberties, it should walk the walk of institutional and constitutional reforms too. I try to voice up the nihilist inside me shouting and screaming in anger, not because I am being glad my country is entangled in a difficult position because of staff incompetence, but because in the long run, some of the choices that were made in marketing our claim might turn out to be wrong, much to our disadvantage.

Finally, Morocco has to be reconciled with its history in this region. As soon as it captures the media initiative, it should dug into core issues, concrete stuff: admit past errors for one. This is all long term work that requires media knowledge and handling our officials direly need.