The Moorish Wanderer

Media Strategy: We’ve Got It Wrong

Much as I would like to comment on the spiral of violence in the Sahara, I have to confess my equal distaste for siding either the Polisario or Makhzenian side. It would have felt like derogating to a credo I fancy: never mix history and media coverage.
Unless someone can claim to be an ubiquitous, omniscient, unbiased and flawless journalist roaming free and loose in the desert taking shots and recording interviews, no one can claim a fair report on the events of violence in Laayoune and other parts of the Sahara (not even the worldwide press agencies). At the present time, trying to make sense out of the Schmilblink is useless, if not the aim of deliberate propaganda, a typical “Them & Us” situation. Better wait and see. The bovine-minded would tease the doubtful for a perceived lack of patriotism, but the sensible way is to observe; the rest is idle chat.

Instead, I would reach upon a much reasonable subject: both sides fielded various sets of media and communication strategy, which would ultimately give the upper hand to either side prior to the expected negotiations on the Sahara issue. On the record, I assume Morocco has a strategy, because from where I see things, it looks bloody amateur to say the least. the Polisario, on the other hand, when they do not put their efficacious propaganda machine into action, benefit almost naturally from sympathetic reports from mainstream media. As far as I am concerned, in media terms, Morocco wiped out the sympathy it got from the Ould Salma case, and finds itself back in the script as the super-villain, close to the low ebb of November 2009, when Aminatou Haidar was expelled.

Clouds and Ashes over Laayoune (Demotix Picture)

Could it get any worse? Very easily so. Could things get better? Difficult, but feasible if our officials get their heads together and start changing their current strategy, or if they had no prior strategy, to come up with one that would rebuild Morocco’s damaged image. Otherwise, that’s incredible leverage to the Polisario in the upcoming UN-backed negotiation talks.

Media strategy in both sides differ wildly in style: in an age of instant information and shrinking margins for cover-ups, the Moroccan response communication strategy is, and one is economical with the terms, weak, and its efficiency highly questionable: deporting journalists and even members of  foreign parliaments does not help. Official web channels, the MAP for instance, have a very weird way in putting Morocco’s case. In facts it is targeting Moroccan audience. Never mind the foreigners, that’s the Moroccans we’ve got to focus on. On the foreign front, the communication strategy the Moroccan officials seem to follow can be reasonably summed up as follows: ideally, it would be enough to convince the 5 permanent members of the Security Council and around 10-11 non permanent members to back -or at least to abstain- a resolution recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty or its autonomy-based proposal, and as the old sayings goes: “جمع و طوي“. A state can claim sovereignty over a defined territory precisely because other sovereign states recognize the fact. Biafra did not make it because it lacked the proper support of sovereign powers, though it was never short of media and NGOs support. That’s the way our officials’ minds could be moving to.  Large sums of money are spent buying off friends in France, Spain, the US, etc… and paying off lobby agencies to market our side of the story to the high spheres of world leaders. Little is spent on media strategy. The idea seems to be that if the governments are ok with it, their mainstream media will follow suit. In short, there is only one media strategy, and that is to devote time and resources to stifle internal dissent. One tries very hard to notice differences in the way the 8 o’clock evening news briefings on the Saharan troubles of the past week differ from those of the early 1980’s. Save for stylistic differences, the message remains the same. For instance, there were casualties among the security forces; This is likely to trigger quite sympathetic comments from Moroccans readers, but to others, they are merely casualties like others. When a 14 years boy was shot around the protest camp, the same readers worldwide would almost instantly feel more upset about him then about the Moroccan policemen and paramilitary. That’s the way it goes down with the media. Experienced government with press officers and media PR professionals find it hard to deal with. Our authorities are definitely not up to scratch with that business.  Communications with the outside world are, at best, defensive and greet foreign observers with deliberate hostility.

On the other hand, the Polisario leads a guerilla-style propaganda. Their media strategy is definitely outward-looking. In short their Press agency does not differ much from ours. But they do not depend on it to rely their side of the story: much of the mainstream media reported their figures instead of the Morocco claims. The protesters at Agdayme Izik were protesting because of their economic difficulties (as the BBC noted) At the moment the media report the fact accurately, but it is at the same time, casting doubts on our officials’ tolerance for dissidence: “[…]But while the demands are social, the scale of the protest — the people in the tent camp represent a sizeable chunk of Western Sahara’s native population — is testing the Moroccan government’s tolerance for dissent, and its nerve.” In any case, the fact the common Moroccan citizen does not care whether the rest of the world believe Morocco is controlling by force a non-autonomous territory (a j’y suis j’y reste sort of state of mind is irrelevant. To readers  and viewers of well-known newspapers, media networks and TV channels, the Western Sahara will look like East Timor and Indonesia. Right now all the niceties about how complex the conflict is, as well as the criticism of the occult intertwined interest in this dispute dragging on for more than 50 years (trace it back to Mauritania’s independence, that is much more accurate) just flew out of the windows for the most vicious, partisan and nationalistic invectives from one side to the other. Algerian and Spanish media -in their majority- back the Polisario because they have special relationship with them. Morocco relies on friendly foreign countries to mop up the mess and stand by them. To the Polisario long-term media strategy of friendly media and reliable channels to echo their speech, our officials adopt short-sighted and short-term tactics that do worse than anything to our claim. Instead, they devote incredible resources to convince the Moroccan people -that are already obedient and compliant to the official line- that indeed, the acts of violence in Laayoune and elsewhere are a trifle. Some marginals and petty criminals that have gone rogue.

In media spin terms, Morocco fights the communications war just as badly as they did during the desert war of 1976-1991. Little training and absolutely no efficient contingent plan to parry enemy influence. On the media front, Morocco is as defensive as isolated as it has been during the 1980’s. And in facts, the way our communications are channelled did not change much before the cold war. These very strategies fail to capture the tremendous impact alternative media have on people’s mind. And whether we like it or not, the countries our officials are counting on to buttress our claim are democractic, and their elected leaders have to be accountable to their electorate. If these become convinced Morocco are the baddies, the friendship between our two countries won’t matter much…

So what? Do we have to stand idle and let them lead us to disaster? Can’t we devise some alternative diplomacy on the subject? Some did. or rather did try, and they were quite sloppy with it, leading to comparative results. The first thing to do, policy-wise, is to be open about it.The chaps at the interior ministry and the royal cabinet should overcome their fear and be open about things. Get an international panel of journalists from international newspapers, representative from foreign countries, NGO activists, UN representatives. Walk them through the scene of violence. At the age of instant information, damage control would be to accept international scrutiny. Second, be credible. It is obvious that standards of living and, to certain extent, civil liberties are better off from our side of the defensive wall. Be bold, media-savyy. It might be all spin, but in people’s mind -outside Morocco, it will look like an honest country trying to be democratic and open-minded, but that’s just the lousy separatists that want to to blow it off. It started to take off with Ould Salma, but now it is gone; I am getting all Malcom Tucker right now, but this spin stuff should not elude us from the core question: institutional reforms. response was weak and disorganised because of the cast-like bureaucratic hierarchy. What we call in Morocco: “التعليمات”. Instructions. The officials, especially at the interior ministry, cannot take a single decision without referring to their superiors. It goes very high all the way up, paralysing thus the local and central administration in case of emergency. And when initiatives are taken, they are sloppy too because no one will turn up and ask questions. For the Moroccan claim to be solid granite, basic democratic mechanisms have to be introduced in the actual spheres of power. If Morocco talks the talk of democracy and civil liberties, it should walk the walk of institutional and constitutional reforms too. I try to voice up the nihilist inside me shouting and screaming in anger, not because I am being glad my country is entangled in a difficult position because of staff incompetence, but because in the long run, some of the choices that were made in marketing our claim might turn out to be wrong, much to our disadvantage.

Finally, Morocco has to be reconciled with its history in this region. As soon as it captures the media initiative, it should dug into core issues, concrete stuff: admit past errors for one. This is all long term work that requires media knowledge and handling our officials direly need.

The Side Show of A Side Show

Posted in Moroccan ‘Current’ News, Morocco, Read & Heard, The Wanderer, Tiny bit of Politics by Zouhair ABH on October 8, 2010

Three main courses for current Moroccan news: Ould Salma, reportedly released from his Polisario jail, Nichane newspaper that went under and finally Fodail Aberkane, an individual killed in a Police station. Mainstream and Blogoma are all over it, so I thought I could add my voice to the herd too. No harm done.

First, Mustapha Salma Ould Sidi Mouloud. It is great to get all misty eyes and all fired up over his misfortunes, and in a way, it would be fair game because last year at the same time, Morocco was down the international gutter because of its behaviour towards pro-independence Sahrawi activist Aminatou Haidar. The tide has since then changed slightly to Morocco’s favour, but overall it does not further our claims, nor does it bring about a final settlement to the present unfortunate situation. I don’t know about my fellow bloggers, but when I watch Moroccan television, or read some of the MAP news agency about the “القضية الوطنية”, the National Issue n°1 as it were, I have the uncomfortable feeling the propaganda is targeted towards the domestic audience.

And what bombastic propaganda that was! Following our forensic experts like M. Nini, we are about to go to war with Algeria (or even Spain) and within a week our soldiers would be sipping tea at Tindouf. All of that while the truth is carefully toned down (there was little publicity about the negotiation rounds that took February 2010), Moroccan officials are in direct negotiations with the Polisario, and matters that occasionally arise are used by each side to put pressure on the other and get the maximum concession out of it.

There is nothing in it for the interest of the common Moroccan or the Sahrawi in Tindouf. As for Ould Salma, he gambled on international support, whether he lost or won is still a matter of debate. Bottom line is, let’s not get too excited and heated up for this.

Ould Salma, former Polisario top raking Police officer, jailed after expressing favourable views on Morocco's autonomy plan

This is merely international politics, a sideshow to cover up for politics that matters. Another sideshow is Nichane newspaper that (finally) shuts down (and up in the process). It is always sad to witness another newspaper shutting down in Morocco; This particular case however is not the result of direct oppression, and one can certainly assert that freedom of speech does not shrink further because of that.

A business has been closed down, but the journalists can still write articles. Nichane, just like its French-speaking sister newspaper TelQuel, and the late Le Journal are not what one can describe as all-out opposition newspapers.

Their founders (Ahmed Réda Benchemsi and Aboubakr Jamaï for Le Journal) are not firebrand dissidents. Both come from quite wealthy backgrounds (Ulad Jamaï are a wealthy family that long served at Imperial court and Benchemsi is related to a former Governor), and if their newspapers close down, they are not going to starve or go on the dole.

In fact, the terms of debate are wrongly defined: the central issue here is not the gagging of freedom of press, it is merely the closing down of a business.

Both Le Journal and Nichane were compelled to close down because of the direct cause of financial difficulties: the first had unpaid social securities contributions, and the second for the lack of advertisement support. Both closed down because they were short of money.

Ahmed Réda Benchemsi Aka “ARB” is known for his fired-up editorials against Islamists

One can cast doubts on whether both newspapers were ill-managed but the fact remains that both newspapers were first and foremost businesses that were profitable at a time, but eventually reached an unbearable level of losses and had to withdraw. As journalists, their founders could always open up a collective blog, or set up another newspaper, their freedom of speech is not endangered.

Their freedom was endangered when they published dissident articles, but not this time with Nichane, nor with Le Journal in February 2010.One can reasonably argue that this seems to be the new strategy censors are pursuing to gag dissidents, and they deserve solidarity but only up to a point.

Journalists in Morocco put themselves in a bit of a spot: right from the start -say the early 90’s- independent journalists hammered a dangerous message on their readers; politicians are all alike, corrupt, opportunists and weak. The message was so well conveyed -and confirmed by unfortunate examples– that in a way, journalists became politicians themselves. No one can deny that Rachid Nini, Ahmed Reda Benchemsi or Jamaï senior and many others do not have their own respective agenda, whether as a reactionary, an anti-islamist or a constitutional reformer

Rachid Nini: Die Nachtrichten Führer

. Independent journalists are the new politicians in Morocco. They do however, fit admirably the cruel yet strikingly in Baldwin’s apophthegm: “Power without responsibility, the prerogative of Harlots through out the ages”.

Power because they do have considerable amount of influence (Nini as a Populist, ARB and Jamai as intellengtsia favourite writers ) but they are answerable to nobody. The other behemoth player is the Makhzen, who occasionally play them off each others, or crush them whenever it is necessary to remind them, and the public that they set up the rules and there are things not to be trifled with.

It is all good to worry about freedom of speech, but one has to keep in mind the wider picture speaks better. It is, quite simply, a storm in a weak tea-cup. Now, do we need to worry about Nichane or independent newspapers in Morocco? Frankly, who cares? the days of militant and impoverished -yet high-standards- journalism in Morocco are over (Mohamed Belhassan El ouazzani was not expecting journalism in Morocco to stoop so low in the business race); we are talking business, and in such matters, there are no good guys and bad guys, only big bucks.

I was amazed to the strength of international media coverage (old farts stick together, don’t they?) as though corporatist solidarity allows journalists to pose as victims (and they certainly are, to an extent) but not in a manner such as the ordinary citizens of  Ben Smim for instance.

37 years old Fodail Aberkane. An anonymous victim of Police brutality

The last piece was left so on purpose, because it is much more important; The first one does not affect us directly as citizens, but merely concerns an unnecessary nationalistic pride we can do without.

The second one is just a matter of money and would-be journalists. The last is about how random and hazardous it is to walk in a police station and walk out of it unharmed and more importantly, alive. I needn’t bore you with details because others have spoken quite eloquently about it. It is as though a brutal reminder was sent to all would-be dissidents that the old institutions are still there, and that at any time, one can meet his maker (and Orangina bottle down their bottom in the process) in a nasty dark little room, downstairs one’s very local police station. Suffice it to remember than, in a Morocco so full of new things and so resolute in its democratic process and open-mindedness, the murder of Fodail Aberkane remains a blot that has never been addressed.

One would certainly say: well, it just happened once, and if it was not for a life, it is no big deal. A reasoning ab absurdo would prove it to be otherwise: assuming what happened in Salé police station was merely a security cock-up, why didn’t the interior ministry suspend the policemen and launch an inquiry on the matter? Don’t they realise that what happened is a disgrace to the uniform of Moroccan police; (the satirical Young Retarded Moroccan Society published a very moving piece about it)

On that melodramatic tone, I wish you all a good week end.

… Et le Maroc passa à côté d’une opportunité historique

Posted in Uncategorized by Zouhair ABH on November 28, 2009


(Note
: le présent article n’est pas une apologie de l’indépendantisme Polisarien. Il s’agit d’un effort de dé construction d’une réalité confuse que très peu de marocains connaissent, car cachée par nos dirigeants depuis 30 ans)

“What does attract you in the desert?”

– “It is clean…”

C’était la réponse du Major T.E. Lawrence (Al-Orance pour les tribus arabes). Le Sahara n’est pas propre. Il est plein d’os blanchis, de carcasses calcinées d’avions, de chars, de divers véhicules, des cadavres d’une guerre qui dure toujours (même avec un cessez-le-feu)

La cause du Sahara, c’est deux thèses antagonistes : Sahara Marocain vs Sahara Occidental. C’est aussi une survivance de la guerre froide, un point où Est et Ouest se mesuraient par marionnettes interposées. Mais au fond, combien de marocains connaissent l’histoire vraie ? Ou tout au moins, combien ont les bonnes informations pour se faire une idée à peu près correcte de la situation ?

I. A l’origine, l’opération Ecouvillon/Ouragan

Ecouvillon a certainement été à l’origine du problème. En 1958, Le Maroc avait une armée ‘officielle’, structurée comme les armées modernes et encadrée à l’européenne (les FAR) et une guérilla bien équipée, très mobile et en constante coordination avec sa consœur algérienne. Il s’agit de l’Armée de Libération Marocaine, qui opérait au nord du Maroc depuis 1955, et qui s’est infiltrée petit à petit au Sud, après la signature des accords de La Celle Saint-Cloud. Ceux qui sont passés par le système marocain se rappellent peut être (ou pas…) les cartes géographiques ou le Maroc recouvre peu à peu son indépendance et son autorité sur des territoires donnés. Au sud de Sidi Ifni, les français et les espagnols étaient encore présents, et l’ALM-Sud opérait souvent des incursions en profondeur pour détruire des installations militaires franco-espagnoles. Cette armée avait des chefs comme Fqih Basri, M. Bensaïd Aït Idder, A. Yousoufi, résistants qui entendaient prolonger la lutte armée pour libérer tous le Maghreb.

Dans ce contexte, la monarchie marocaine (ainsi que ses alliés ‘objectifs’ en Europe et aux Etats-Unis) s’inquiétait de ce rival potentiel, d’autant plus que l’ALM était qualitativement et quantitativement supérieure aux FAR : certes, les officiers coloniaux marocains reversés étaient compétents, mais l’expérience unique des combattants de l’ALM, rodés aux opérations de guérilla (urbaine et classique) et de style ‘commandos’ lui donnait un avantage décisif. Cette ALM était donc un danger pour la monarchie, qui tenta par tous les moyens de l’asphyxier : en essayant de corrompre ses dirigeants (Sanhaji raconte que tout chef de l’ALM qui faisait allégeance à la monarchie avec un groupe de plus de 25 combattants était automatiquement intégré à la fonction publique, aux FAR, était éligible à un agrément de transport, etc…)

Ou encore en coupant les vivres : sous sa primature, A. Ibrahim a souvent défendu Benhamou et Basri devant Mohamed V, et surtout, My Hassan, les premiers se plaignaient de l’interruption du ravitaillement, interruption initiée par le prince héritier, et de son conseiller militaire, le Cdt Blair (de l’US Navy et très probablement de la CIA)

En 1958, Les combattants de l’ALM avaient habitude de partir de leurs bases en territoire marocain –avec la discrète neutralité bienveillante des gardes frontières marocains- et frapper en zone occupée. Les franco-espagnols décident de couper court à l’impunité des combattants ALM et larguent un millier de parachutistes derrière la frontière marocaine (le 7ème Régiment de Para Coloniaux et la Légion étrangère espagnole y participent) et prennent à revers l’ALM et les tribus sahraouies qu’elle arme. Elle est donc entièrement annihilée, et beaucoup de sahraouis garderont souvenir de cette opération. Les membres de l’ALM gardent le souvenir d’une trahison, les autorités marocaines les ayant abandonnés face à un adversaire bien renseigné et surtout, largement supérieur en nombre et en matériel (que peuvent faire les mortiers et fusils des combattants, contre les avions et les canons lourds du contingent Franco-espagnol ?)

Pour le Polisario, l’ALM était simplement un corps d’instructeur (mercenaires même). On comprendra plus tard pourquoi ce mythe fondateur est nécessaire à la littérature du Polisario pour trouver les racines d’un ‘nationalisme sahraoui’.

II El Ouali Mustapha Sayyed : Un patriote mal connu

« Fils de résistant, issu de la tribu des Thallat, le futur leader sahraoui grandit à Tan Tan, entre à l’école tardivement.[…] (Il) s’inscrit en faculté de droit à Rabat. C’est là que sa conscience politique se forme. […] Ses enseignants saluent ce “pur idéaliste dont l’adversité ne semble pas dévoyer la cause sahraouie”, ses camarades apprécient cet “esprit libre qui ne souffre aucun sectarisme”.

El Ouali n’envisage pas l’indépendance, bien au contraire. “Ces dignes héritiers de l’ALN veulent parachever ce qui n’a pas été permis à leurs aînés, réparer cette frustration, encore cruellement vivace, d’avoir été empêchés de pénétrer au Sahara armes à la main”, se rappelle un militant de gauche, qui les a côtoyés.

Entre-temps, El Ouali voyage, commence par l’Algérie où Bensaïd Aït Ider lui apporte son appui, jusqu’au jour où il lui fait état de ses projets sécessionnistes. “La révolution au Maroc, oui, mais la scission du territoire, non”, » (TelQuel n°210)

A l’évidence, quelque chose s’est passé entre le moment où El Ouali militait pour le rattachement du Rio de Oro espagnol au Maroc, et le moment où il fait appel à la Libye, puis aux Algériens pour armer et financer ce qui deviendra plus tard le Polisario. A Tan Tan en 1972, El Ouali organise une manifestation contre l’occupation espagnole du Sahara, est arrêté, puis enlevé par la police marocaine, puis relâché quelques mois plus tard. Bien entendu, cette arrestation en plus de ses activités politiques à l’UNEM, font qu’il passera par la torture ordinaire de l’époque. Dans l’optique makhzénienne, le patriotisme ne peut s’exprimer que par ses voies officielles, en proclamant l’attachement au trône et à la monarchie. C’est cette vision qui peut expliquer partiellement la décision de la monarchie pour étouffer l’ALM en la livrant littéralement, aux anciens colonisateurs. la majorité des combattants n’était peut être pas républicaine, mais aspirait vivement à un nouvel ordre des choses, ce que la monarchie, et –cette fois, ses alliés intérieurs- les anciens collaborateurs réhabilités, refusait catégoriquement.

El Ouali est donc dégoûté, mais ne se tourne pas directement vers le séparatisme. Il rallie les dirigeants de gauche, exilés en Algérie ou en France (Bensaïd Aït Idder ou Fqih Basri) pour participer à leurs projets (notamment l’organisation du Tanzim.) : ‘Arrivé à Tripoli le fqih Basri enrôle (El Ouali){…}, très vite, Mahmoud (Bennouna) et Basri découvrent en El Ouali les qualités d’un chef capable d’ouvrir un troisième front dans le Sud’

Remarquons que jusqu’en 1973, El Ouali opère avec des marocains, en tant quel tel, pour combattre le despotisme hassanien de l’époque. Après ? On peut lier deux évènements à l’intervention des services secrets algériens : Mars 1973 a été échec pour le Tanzim, car ce dernier a été, entre autres, infiltré par des agents marocains avec la neutralité bienveillante des algériens, ces derniers ayant aussi opposé toutes sortes de difficultés pour l’approvisionnement et les communications. Du côté d’El Ouali, il n’est pas impossible de penser qu’une manipulation algérienne et libyenne l’ait conduit à envisager de plus en plus l’idée d’un Sahara indépendant. Quand il est question d’Algérie ou de Libye ici, ce sont des forces occultes, manipulées à leur tour par les services de renseignement de pays plus grands : CIA et KGB ont déjà eu l’occasion de coopérer pour dévoyer des mouvements tiers-mondistes à leur propre bénéfice…

10 Mai 1973, le Polisario est officiellement créé, et engage des raids contre les postes espagnols : il ne s’attaque pas au territoire marocain, et se focalise sur la lutte contre les espagnols. Juin 1976, sa petite colonne est éliminée par l’armée Mauritanienne (avec le soutien de l’aviation française ?) devant Nouakchott. Sa mort ouvre la voie à une nouvelle phase dans le problème du Sahara.

III. Le Maroc, La Marche Verte, la guerre des sables

En 1975, la Monarchie ne tient que par la terreur policière. Hassan II a besoin de reprendre l’initiative face à un mécontentement populaire croissant (on enregistre de plus en plus de révoltes populaires dans les petites localités perdues du Maroc inutile) et des dates comme 1971, 1972 et 1973, prouvent qu’on peut dangereusement menacer le pouvoir. C’est ainsi que la marche verte allait permettre à la monarchie de reprendre l’initiative, et réactiver -à son bénéfice bien sûr- le vieux nationalisme marocain. Curieux retournement de situation : la Koutla (Istiqlal, UNFP puis l’USFP qui se créé en 1975 par scission de l’UNFP) qui compte beaucoup d’anciens résistants, perd une revendication qu’elle a longtemps fait sienne : la récupération des territoires marocains encore sous domination colonialiste (y compris la Mauritanie) à un moment où la monarchie souhaitait d’abord consolider son emprise sur les territoires de 1956. La Marche verte, est, en ce sens, une initiative audacieuse, plus dirigée vers des buts de politique intérieure, que par des considérations de ‘libération nationale’. 1975, c’est aussi l’année de la mort de F. Franco, dictateur de l’Espagne et, comme son collègue Salazar, inconscient des changements du monde après 1945.

La Marche verte, c’est aussi l’infiltration des FAR en zone sud, et dès 1976, des accrochages avec l’APLN Algérienne, et le Polisario, qui se renforce des milices espagnoles, composées de soldats Sahraouis. le Polisario, en plus de disposer d’une force armée disciplinée et en parfaite connaissance du terrain, reçoit du matériel moderne de Libye, d’Allemagne de l’Est, le Yougoslavie et de Tchécoslovaquie, et des renseignements précieux des Algériens. le Maroc reçoit le soutien de la France et des USA, mais le matériel reçu n’est pas très utile dans une guerre du désert, où la mobilité et l’armement léger et rustique obtiennent plus de résultats qu’une armée conventionnelle, à l’armement certes de qualité, mais fragile sous le climat sec du Sahara, et l’incompétence de militaires ayant peu ou pas d’expérience. Ce n’est qu’en 1991 que le climat se détend, et les deux belligérants signent un cessez-le-feu.

IV. Quel Sahara pour quel Maroc ?

La proposition marocaine d’autonomie sahraouie suppose un référendum constitutionnel : une partie du territoire marocain disposera d’une autonomie accrue, et le principe d’extension de ces avantages à d’autres régions marocaines suppose un changement profond du système administratif du pays. Un changement de telle ampleur doit s’effectuer à travers un réaménagement de la constitution. Une solution parmi d’autres serait de faire du Maroc une fédération de régions avec de larges attributions, mais qui se rattachent à l’idéal du Maroc pluriel mais indivisible. Une réforme constitutionnelle, redistribuant les pouvoirs au bénéfice du peuple marocain, sera nécessaire pour faire en finir avec ce ‘grand malentendu’

Bibliographie :

TelQuel n°210

‘Héros sans Gloire, Echec d’une révolution’ Mehdi Bennouna

‘Les Trois Rois’ Ignace Dalle

‘سنوات الصمود في قلب الإعصار’ Mohamed Louma & Abdellah Ibrahim

‘La Grance Encycolpédie du Maroc – Institutions’ Collectif