The Moorish Wanderer

Five Score Years Later…

Posted in Ancient Times, Happy Times, Moroccan History & Sociology, Morocco, Read & Heard, The Wanderer by Zouhair Baghough on March 31, 2012

La Marche de l’Histoire” is perhaps the best Radio France Inter broadcasts – not nearly as great as its predecessor 2000 d’Histoire- but still; On March 9th Jean Lebrun invited Professor E. Berenson (NYU) to talk about Hubert Lyautey, conqueror, pacifier and first Resident General of the French Moroccan protectorate.

Download: Lyautey_RFI.mp3?w=4e1d0679

you can download the entire broadcast on this weblink [mp3]

But my blogpost isn’t about Maréchal Lyautey. It is not even about French colonialism; I should say I have a declared interest in this; my entire higher education so far has been conducted under the French Grandes Ecoles system, and there is no doubt in my mind that until recently, my Weltschauung has been very French-centred. Education, cultural references, even my early reading list on Moroccan politics has been fashioned by French authors, historians or French-speaking references.If anything, me blogging in English is a kind of redemption from la Langue de Molière, and I don’t buy into the idea that Arabic as my natural lingua franca, Pan-arabism is just as dismal a cultural colonialism as the French influence.

former Sultan Abdelhafid posing as a gentleman farmer, carrying his nephew and future Hassan II (Source: Le Journal Hebdomadaire)

Sultan Abdelhafid signed the Fez treaty on March 30th 1912; Historians report that Saturday was rainy and grey – that day formalized Morocco’s loss of sovereignty. How it came to the Spanish-French protectorate has been pretty well established: high foreign debt, increasing foreign pressures to meddle with Imperial finances, and a traditionally weak central authority failing even to perform the basic -some might say sole- task of levying taxes, let alone suppress successfully Roguis and tribal uprisings all over the Cherifian empire. A succession of military defeats and weak sultans allowed French cavalry columns to egress North of the Sahel and West from the Moroccan-Algerian border, and a stylish, bloody shelling, then landing on the shores of the future Casablanca in 1907. Spaniards took advantage of

C.R. Pennell reports:

While French and Spanish troops nibbled at Moroccan territory, European creditors drained the treasury. Moulay Abdelhafid could not fulfil his bay’a by recovering the lost lands, nor by ending the debt.

The new Sultan needed money. He had recognised the Act of Algeciras, which has undermined his authorities, but customs dues alone were not enough. Abdelhafid needed foreign loans. Between January and April 1909 negotiations in Fez and in Paris produced a proposal to reorganize the Moroccan debt, at the price of increased French control over the Chaouïa and Oujda where only the fiction of Makhzen authority would be maintained.

That served Lyautey well, as he did not use brutal force to invade Morocco; he dubbed his strategy ‘oil slick’, which precluded slash and burn tactics the Spanish army was so keen on carrying out in the Northern part of Morocco. By 1912, the enthusiastic coalition that supported Abdelhafid’s bid for the Imperial throne waned: Chorfa and Ulamas, long exempted from tax duties,  refused to pay the Tartib (a non-Islamic tax) and so did the Guich tribes;

Abdelhafid was nominated under the conditions he would drive away the Christian aliens, he turned out to be their puppet, in 1910 Colonel Mangin was appointed to reorganise the Moroccan regular army, while French banks controlled all the receipts from the 227 Million francs foreign trade.

The idea of maintaining local elites and the Sultan wasn’t entirely Lyautey’s idea: Consul Gaillard pushed for a subtle indirect rule, whereby French troops were stationed in Morocco officially to restore the Sultan’s rule and protect his throne and his dynasty:

Article III: Le Gouvernement de la République prend l’engagement de prêter un constant appui à Sa Majesté Chérifienne contre tout danger qui menacerait Sa personne ou Son trône qui compromettrait la tranquilité de Ses Etats. Le même appui sera prêté à l’héritier du trône et à ses successeurs

(Fez Treaty – BO n°1 dated 11/01/1912)

France’s Premier R. Poincaré gave reason to Lyautey and Gaillard (promoted to the newly created Diplomatic Bureau of the Resident-General) over General Moinier (who was in favour of direct rule) and the attached legislation to the Fez treaty effectively put the Resident-Generalship under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – not the War Ministry.

But the reality of French rule was very Jacobin: military governors answered directly to General Lyautey, and civil comptrollers ranked second to the military establishment. Initially those arrangements were dictated by the urgency of dispatching a rapid-response force to the sporadic mutinies in the newly (re)created, 12,000 strong Moroccan army, and against the tribal M’hallas besieging Fez, Sefrou and Hajeb. Abdelhafid surrendered Morocco’s sovereignty (sold out, as a matter of fact), but the new Sheriff in town had to conquer a contentious land and wage a political fight with perpetually warring tribes. in Fez, Colonel Gouraud had to break the siege, while French columns were rushed to Souss and Marrakech to deal with Desert warriors led by Ahmed El Hiba.

The ‘Pacification’ officially ended in 1934, long after Lyautey had left the Resident-Generalship.

Is anyone thinking about 2016?

Posted in Moroccan Politics & Economics, Morocco, Read & Heard, The Wanderer by Zouhair Baghough on March 5, 2012

It seems not. A year seems to be a long time in Moroccan politics, and all across the political spectrum, politicians and activists do not seem to take a step back an look at the big picture, even the most experienced and respected of those.

Winners and Losers, but ultimately losers for failing to provide Moroccans with a vision.

Fouad Abdelmoumni, a respected Human Rights activists and a father-figure (of sorts) with the Feb20 movement, expressed short-sightedness in his analysis regarding the future of this government. He claims:

Enfin, les prochaines semaines nous montreront si ce gouvernement est conscient qu’il joue sa survie, celle d’un parti majeur et celle du pays. La crise va bientôt peser de tout son poids, et le Maroc n’a que le choix d’en sortir par le haut, à travers la démocratie, l’effort et les solutions courageuses, sous peine de sombrer à plus ou moins brève échéance dans les frustrations et la confrontation. Il convient surtout de ne pas oublier que les anciens expédients par lesquels le Maroc a pu tenir (répression, corruption, division des opposants, monopole de l’information…) sont révolus, et que la rue ne manquera pas de demander des comptes dès la fin de la “période de grâce” du gouvernement.

And I suspect many activists are thinking the same thing: that PJD-led government coalition, just like the Constitutional Referendum and Parliamentary Elections are a patch to contain the growing social resentment against repression, nepotism and the like. That may be true, but still, it does not absolve the movement -and the Moroccan left- from building a truly comprehensive pro-democracy platform, or at least to provide clear-cut, unambiguous set of principles to which a majority of Moroccans can relate to.

The mainstream political spectrum also seems to be lacking their own political Weltanschauung: can anyone state precisely how USFP, or PAM, or UC stand on specific issues as well as broad principles? In fact, screw broad principles, as they bear little meaning in Moroccan politics: PAM defines itself as a left-leaning party with a former CDG Sovereign fund CEO and technocrat Mustapha Bakkouri, and USFP, a member of the Socialist Internationale, has been a lifelong partner of conservative and crypto-islamist Istiqlal within the Historic Koutla, now a junior partner with the PJD-led government. As for the government, the mere fact a coalition is in cahoots until 2016 makes it sure no viable strategy is devised anywhere near 2016; in fact, it is very likely to be “2016 and bust”.

Since principles bear little significance to party politics in Morocco, only precise, comprehensive sets of policy agenda can be useful in defining the dividing lines of Moroccan politics. As for how parties view themselves in the next couple of years, mum’s the word; and I suspect this is due to their refusal to commit to a long-term vision. And there are basically two ways to go to explain it: lack of vision or excessive caution. Either way, it does not serve the public well.

What’s a vision for 2016? And Isn’t the date itself an example of political short-sightedness? Indeed. But the centrepiece of representative democracy is the rough-and-tumble of political campaigning induced by elections. And these usually trigger timely commitments from representatives and political leaders – perhaps we should consider elections every two years: 4 years of a full parliament intertwined with 4 years of local/regional elections.

Until they can come up with a comprehensive -and I insist on that term COMPREHENSIVE- agenda in all areas of pubic policy, they will have to focus on specific issues, preferably away from identity and culture stuff, like… the veil for instance; I’d rather prefer the public discourse go: “They will tax you back to the stone ages” vs “Tax breaks for the rich, additional burden for the middle classes”

A Dangerous Game: 5% Deficit and Mounting Public Debt

Posted in Dismal Economics, Moroccan Politics & Economics, Morocco, Read & Heard, The Wanderer by Zouhair Baghough on March 2, 2012

I most certainly will devote a post underlying the inherent dangers of a large public debt on the Moroccan economy, especially when one considers it lives the closing moments of its expansionary cycle. But for now, I can only make the argument that a well-meaning government balks at serious fiscal policy schemes, and subsequently is running this country into uncharted and dangerous territories.

The various disclosed figures every now and then for the past week all point to a relatively high public borrowing requirements to match the unchanged total fiscal pressure – that stands at around 17.5% GDP and pay for the rather large increases in public spendings, in education, health and housing.

Will they make it safely to 2016?

While the government has pursued a commendable agenda in boosting spending in these departments, I fear the hikes in public debt, and the high levels of deficit will soon put a stop to the committed level of spendings.

Le Matin Newspaper reported on the press briefing during which some of the most important Budget figures were unveiled, and one can read:

Le deuxième volet a trait aux politiques sociales. L’enseignement sera doté de 51 milliards de dirhams, la santé de 12 milliards de dirhams, la politique de l’Habitat de 3 milliards de dirhams. [...] Côté fiscalité, on n’enregistre aucun changement au niveau des taux déjà appliqués que ce soit au niveau de l’IS ou de la TVA.

That explains how the deficit first went from an initial projected 22 Billion deficit (around 3.2% GDP) to the 5% projected for 2012, that is 41 Billion – or almost 20 Bn of net additional spending. The previous Budget Bill projected 144Bn in fiscal receipts. The new deficit compounds the following:

* +4 Billion in education

* +2 Billion for Health

* +3 Billion for Housing

* +13 Billion for collective bargaining

I have some doubts about the last two items, given the high spending commitments relative to the budget allocated to departments in charge, and these might as well be part of the bombastic 188 Billion public investment target (most likely 64 Billion of Investment Budget) as for the other spending pledges, the 1Bn support scheme for private employment already exists -the net increase is a modest 360 Million dirham, up from the initial 640 Million. Moreover, the budget bill seems to provide for an additional 470 new public service jobs (up from the initial 25,734) the only new alternative -but not exclusive- policy to the Compensation Fund quagmire is a meagre 1Bn for the so-called solidarity fund – 50% less from what was talked about before the Election.

Overall, that means, ceteris paribus, the total Public Borrowings Requirements for 2012 will go up to *drum rolls* 66 Billion dirhams. For 2012, the government has to borrow that amount of money, which equates 1.6 receipts from the corporate tax, 2.3 receipts from the income tax, and most worryingly, one-fourth of total receipts for the Budget.

Wandering Thoughts, Vol.16

Posted in Dismal Economics, Flash News, Morocco, Read & Heard, The Wanderer, Wandering Thoughts by Zouhair Baghough on January 29, 2012

Gary Oldman as George Smiley (Salon.com)

Two movies I have been watching and re-watching these last couple of days: ‘Funeral In Berlin‘ and the brand new ‘Tinker, Taylor, Soldier Spy’ movie adaptation of John LeCarré most famous novel. in fact, both are film adaptation of serial best-selling novels: George Smiley and Harry Palmer are two anti-hero spies, but with different characters, to say the least.

Palmer and Stok meeting in West Berlin

Harry Palmer (Michael Caine) and Colonel Stok (Oskar Homolka)

Tinker Taylor circa 2011 is much darker than the 1970s TV Movie with Alec Guiness; but then again I guess it has to be so – although I suspect Gary Oldman‘s performance was closely following that of Guiness’, going by the book, so to speak: George Smiley is a withdrawn, taciturn old man who doesn’t really fit in with the James Bond common type of spy. John LeCarr’sé best book so far (although I would say the final opus of that Karla-Smiley struggle did top it up) draws apparently a lot from his experience as an intelligence officer with MI5 in Austria.

Karla, the cunning Soviet master spy was found to be inspired by the head of East German intelligence Markus Wolf – Radio France Inter’s broadcast show “Rendez-Vous avec X” mentioned him in two interesting episodes about East German spy rings in France – the infamous Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HvA) was perhaps the best intelligence apparatus East of the Iron Curtain, on par with KGB’s operations -

Harry Palmer, on the other hand, is a different kind of spy: a former Corporal with the British Army, coerced into joining the Intelligence Corps after he was convicted of petty crime when stationed in Berlin. His supervisors made use of his “criminal tendencies” (as cited in “The ICPRESS File” novel) to carry on the covert side of East/West confrontation, this time in Berlin, a flashpoint of the Cold War; Berlin again, where the Karla-Smiley confrontation finds its dénouement, with Karla surrendering to the British in “Smiley’s People” (Karla’s identity is hidden in the 2011 adaptation (Mike Sarne apparently played the part) but revealed quite openly in the 1970s TV movies, portrayed by Patrick Stewart – in a manner that mirrors Smiley’s placid character.

LeCarré's cameo appearance as a Circus official

David John Moore Cornwell singing the Soviet Anthem (Picture from the film)

Oh, and LeCarré himself made a cameo appearance in the film, (humorously) singing the Soviet Anthem during a Circus’ Christmas party. The move has been very faithful to the novel’s narrative, very much so.

I don’t know why I compared these two films/novels, but they do share a lot in common: they both depict the Cold War as it really was, much more nuanced and dark than blockbusters suggest.

Back on the news front: twice nominated, never got to actually lay my hands on the much prized award. I guess Moroccan web-users have made up their minds about what they want to read and what blogs they enjoy.

So congratulations for Lcassetta Blog, voted best 2012 Blog, and for winners from other categories. The honour of being twice nominated is quite sufficient for me, I guess.

I have enjoyed a very refreshing, populist, funny, witty and spirited address delivered by our new Head Of Government, Abdelilah Benkirane.

An hour-long address during which he wandered off-topic quite a lot; perhaps it is part of his personality to be as spontaneous as he can be, and I can understand it carries some charm -and electoral appeal- to his party. But showmanship could hurt him personally as a government leader and politician. His address was his opportunity to set the record in his favour. The great thing about the unusually intense media coverage (on social media at least) is that it might well prompt a new level of civic scrutiny of government work. In essence, PJD-led coalition government has to do with opposition within and outside parliament, as well as, I hope civic awareness to their policies. 2011 showed a substantial part of the real electorate can choose wisely, 2016 is proving to be an even more exciting election, and I am looking forward to it ;the run-off to the next parliamentary elections, regional and local, will prove this optimism right or wrong.

Other than that, I have been working on a rather ambitious project – a Shadow Budget proposal of sorts, with detailed proposals on something I am increasingly considering as a sound fiscal policy: introducing a pre-computed Debt-Ceiling for the next budget year. It’s fiscal discipline and it shows a government is determined not to let the deficit go crazy – unless it warrants it. And so far, running a structural deficit because of the 2008 unsound tax cuts made the couple of last budget laws rely more and more on public debt; as long as business cycles are on the upswing, it doesn’t really matter. But with a weak stock exchange performance and an expected contraction in foreign demand for Moroccan exports, it would be sound to switch as early as possible revenues back to taxation; a deterrent on debt-financed deficit would be simply to cap it, then make it difficult to raise that ceiling mid-year.

Annual borrowing requirements almost double since mid 2007. Not the stuff to make headlines

But who cares really? The sad reality is, no one, media or politicians alike, dares to muddy their shirts and go down the numbers; taxations, fiscal exemptions, fiscal deficit and public debt surely can get technical at times, but still, the debate must start at one point. Or perhaps there is some kind of unspoken consensus running across party lines, including the pro-democracy platform, no to discuss matters that may well be more important than anything else: the livelihood of future generations.

What’s Left in Morocco? The Case For Progressive, Ambitious and Assertive Economic Policies

Posted in Dismal Economics, Moroccan Politics & Economics, Read & Heard, The Wanderer by Zouhair Baghough on December 31, 2011

Call me pretentious, effete intellectual, but I deplore the absence of a comparable figure with a narrative close to that of Ed Ball‘s in the Moroccan political discourse: the bare-knuckled, assertive, even aggressive economic message pounded away at the media, the established government and those who tend to disparage the left-wingers as either bleeding-heart liberal unable to go beyond the nice but vague rethoric and principles, or corrupt career politicians driven with an insatiable hunger for power and wealth.

A New Hope For Progressive Economics

The late 1950s were about gaining economic independence: big government was needed to monitor and smooth the transition from a French-controlled economy to a more ‘national’, domestic economy. Abderrahim Bouabid, during his tenure as Finances Minister and then Vice-Head of Cabinet (with Premiers M’barek Bekkaï, Ahmed Balafrej and Abdellah Ibrahim) produced what could well be the most prolific executive legislation, ranging from creation of Dirham Currency to that of the future Bank Al Maghrib Central Bank, and various institutions, among others the modern Office des Changes to monitor flows of foreign capital, and make sure the financial instruments needed to carry out monetary policy are mastered and under domestic control. That gilded age of the Left of sorts needs to be restored, not with the same means, but with the same spirit, in resolution and assertiveness.

Big government, strangely enough, is favoured both by the Left (extending as far as Annahj far-left) and Makhzen traditionalists: a strong centre is needed to insure one or the other’s political and economic agenda is well executed. The core difference in their economics matters very little at the end: whether concentrated with a small nucleus of wealthy individuals (the Right and the ongoing pursued policy higher up are keen on supply-side economics) or a core of activists-bureaucrats (The left) there is very little difference but in the quality of the oligarchy.

Half a century of centralized decision-making and, even worse, centralized way of thinking has made public services in Morocco accountable to no one, with ordinary, median/average citizens at the receiving end of both administrative carelessness and more concentrated income distribution (in 1985, Gini Income Index was 0.36; in 2010, it was 0.46) So the justification by the Left of big government and burdensome regulations is void: it did not prevent private monopolies and special interests from taking a slice of the national cake, an increasing slice on top of it, guaranteed and protected by regulations and legislation.

Perhaps the Moroccan Left and Liberals need to accommodate burdensome and embarrassing allies: the corrupt and shady Unions, the powerful corporatist interests they support and count on (Lawyers, for one) and finally the once-loyal support of lower echelon in the Civil Service. The problem with such coalition is that it lacks the actual strength -never mind the consistency- to impose its supposedly progressive agenda; Regarding unions, their massive and disruptive potential has waned and they can no longer muster enough resources to stage demonstrations, let alone force deals for everyone to benefit from. The same goes for the special interest groups, strong enough to block attempts to force the status-quo, but too weak and divided to formulate and impose clear a coherent set of policies.

A coalition needs to be built around the ideals of progress, economic advancement and social justice – in that order. I cannot claim to produce reliable surveys on that topic, but it seems to me that fellow Moroccans I happen to engage with in discussions still view Socialism (that word really has gone out of fashion, hasn’t it?) and its economic policies as mainly Social, i.e. subsidizing the poor and soothing social resentment from inequalities; In other words, my non-representative sample does not believe Socialism can deliver on the economy: high growth, good jobs and high standards of living. I argue it can, but with unorthodox means. That coalition – Unions, Corporatist Interests and the weakened Middle Classes- is the key to the new progressive economic policies.

Food And Balance Of Trade: Imports of Wheat in Morocco amounted in 2010 to MAD 11.85Bn i.e. about 7.5% of Trade Balance deficit. The value per Imported Tone for Wheat is MAD 2.15 per Kg. More importantly, it has also imported MAD 93.6 Mln in various types of flour, We do import some fish flour; around 3 Tons – For all Morocco. And we export 4kgs (filed under FARINE,POUDRE EN PELLETS DE POISSON PR ALIMENTATION HUMAINE). That’s both laughable and symptomatic of a misguided choice of resources allocations.

As per FAO documents, Fish Flour provides superior nutrition value, because it can, if efficiently implemented, make up for a chronically low meat/protein consumption among Moroccan households, thus providing a cheaper and more popular alternative to traditional sources of meat consumption:

Why is FPC a good protein source?

First, of course, because it is concentrated; untreated and unprocessed foods do not generally contain more than about 20 percent protein, whereas FPC contains about 80 per cent. Secondly, the quality of the protein is high; by this is meant that the amino acids which make up the protein are present in just the right balance for human nutrition. Other foods such as cereals may contain useful amounts of protein but are frequently deficient in one or more of the amino acids that are essential for growth.

And there goes a policy that can win favour with a lot of people: all consumers will welcome a new class of flour that would enhance their consumption and increase their standard of living, producers and fisheries would expand their business to meet the demand, and prices of poultry, beef and lamb would decrease too. The one question remains: does Morocco have enough resources to meet the demand of 32 Mln hungry Moroccans?

According to the Russian Soy-Bean Company “Russoya” , The ratio for production is around 1/6, meaning there is a need for 6 Tons of raw fish to produce 1 Ton of pure fish flour. Morocco exports 222,000 Tons of Fishery at a unitary price value of MAD 29 per exported kilogram. If it switches to integral fish flour, it can produce 37,000 Tons at a unitary price of MAD 75 per exported kilogram, or even match up to 126 kg per imported kilogram. This is a win-win policy: in trade, Morocco saves up on differential traded value (on terms of trade) in domestic consumption, it increases protein consumption to higher levels, and in business, it allows for thriving companies to fish, condition and sell the product.

The 2001 HCP survey on household consumption points out that flour makes up for 55% of all wheat household consumption – and that percentage goes higher with the lower-income deciles: the poorer a household, the higher its consumption of flour – 70% for the bottom 20%. By the same findings, poorer households have a lower meat/protein consumption: there is a 1:64 ratio between the bottom and top 20% in terms of protein consumption. Perhaps the wisest and most straightforward policy to increase protein consumption across the board is simply to stop subsidizing wheat flour, and instead improve storage and distribution facilities for Fish flour. The trade-off is such that any anticipated costs for increasing production capacities -for domestic resources- would still be outweighed by the compensation fund allocation to wheat flour -an international commodity with volatile prices.

The rest is history: improving nutrition improves workforce, productivity, growth and leads to an increase in standards of living.

Small Business vs Big Business: I tried in a post earlier this year to explain that smaller businesses tend to do better in valuation and results. We need to do away with the myth of “National Champions” because they only contribute to accumulate wealth with little or no real investment in the economy. Smaller businesses on the other hand, take risks and try to make something real with positive impact on communities and individuals.

Small Cap Index beats MASI Big Business by comfortable margin during 2011

The admission that capitalism is good does not preclude the reservation on the current economic structure of Moroccan business, which is neither capitalism nor beneficial to the many – only to the very few. MASI index -dominated by juggernauts- systematically did worse when compared to smaller cap-based indexes this year.

Still and all, access to liquidity is heavily skewed towards large businesses; credit rationing, with its adverse effects, turns out to harm smaller and riskier businesses, not because of their inherent risk,  but because all liquidity has been captured by failing, larger companies. Regulations as well as dangerous acquaintances between businesses and banks makes access to liquidity discriminatory.

Parallel to an overhaul in credit allocation, there is a need to take on private monopolies and oligopolies: these harm collective welfare and destroy utility in the process: in Telecommunications, Edible food and other sectors, consumers pay more than they should in a more competitive market. Taking on business special interests means breaking up monopolies and concentrated holdings: SNI (formerly ONA-SNI), for instance goes too far in extending its hold on various business, ranging from Air Travel, Milk and Derivatives, Edible Oils, to the Banking industry. It is only populist in naming and shaming particular businesses, but the positive effects of a less concentrated and more competitive market setting will undoubtedly benefit everyone, from unions to end-users.

Agriculture, Taxation with Representation: tax exemption on agricultural products denotes of an obsolete, neoclassical mind-setting, if not outright narrow political calculations to keep off some lucrative rents going on. Taxation, contrary to a belief only too often held by many Moroccans, is not the modern equivalent of a punitive Harka expedition, a fiscal exaction of sorts; it is a policy instrument, that intervenes either to redistribute social surplus or to provide resources to public authorities so as to help what it perceives to be a potential new frontier. Both elements are designed within a political agenda, whose chief executive implements because they have a popular mandate for it.

Agricultural taxation will help overcome its biggest problem: estate domains; because Agrarian Reform still has not gone out of style, the progressive policy seeks to clarify, to introduce transparency on who owns what, on how collective ownership is defined. Because as long as no proper and serious tax proposal is introduced, as long as the tax moratorium is decreed -until 2013, that is- only big, urban-dwellers, export-oriented wealthy farmers will benefit from the opaque estate regulations. The point made earlier on breaking up monopolies fully applies to Agriculture as well.

Breaking the ceiling of Potential Growth: this topic is less obvious to policy-makers because it outlives their short political lifespan; it is about the general trend of education, research, finding ways to improve production and productivity, in short, the institutional elements fit to guarantee a solid base for growth and wealth creation. These are the issues where politics, the rule of law and economic, practical policies meet: the challenge to lay ahead is to produce adequate legislative framework to guarantee the rule of law and minimize administrative discretion over private ventures, to provide efficient and talented skilled workforce with good education and stable prospects, for both labour and business, and finally to find by ourselves, the perpetual ways to improve output and ensure growth does not do away.